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1

The reflexivity-complexity foundations of Keynes’s philosophical thinking

I argue that the ‘continuing relevance’ of Keynes’s philosophical thinking is due not only to the
originality of Keynes’s insights at the time that he wrote but also to his anticipating philosophical
ideas that we are only now beginning to appreciate in connection with the emergence of
complexity thinking in economics. In this paper, then, I will explain Keynes’s philosophical
thinking in terms of its anticipation of complexity theory. Roberto Marchionatti (2010) previously
made a related argument through a careful examination of Keynes’s Treatise on Probability and
The General Theory.

I will follow his lead but attempt to extend his analysis by arguing that

reflexivity is a central feature of the philosophical foundations of complexity theory, and by
showing that Keynes employed an understanding of reflexivity and reflexive relationships in both
his philosophical and economic thinking.
A fundamental philosophical concept in Keynes’s thinking, of course, is his conception of
uncertainty. Thus, with my focus on reflexivity and complexity, I will argue that Keynes’s
understanding of uncertainty rests on a reflexivity-complexity theory basis, which I characterize
as an ontological basis because it concerns the nature of reality. I will contrast this foundation for
Keynes’s uncertainty concept with the epistemic basis often ascribed to it associated with the idea
that we are simply cannot know the future, and argue that the epistemic basis for the concept
presupposes the ontological one.
Thus the philosophical discussion in the paper moves from reflexivity to complexity to
uncertainty. Of these subjects, reflexivity is the relatively unexamined domain, at least in regard
to Keynes’s thinking. However, I argue that many years ago Keynes made reflexivity key to both
his 1938 characterization of economics as a moral science and his General Theory beauty contest
characterization of agent interaction and speculative behavior by showing how causal
relationships are accompanied by feedback effects. In doing so he outlined two interconnected
ways in which reflexivity operates in economics: how the economy functions as sets of reflexive
processes driven by the behavior of reflexive agents, and how the whole of economy and its parts
reflexively affect each other. This paper argues that together these two dimensions of Keynes’s
philosophical thinking provide foundations for explaining how and why the economy functions as
a complex system, provides a key to Keynes’s conception of uncertainty in the economy, and tells
us something about his view of time.
The organization of the paper is as follows.

Section 2 discusses the reflexivity-complexity

philosophical foundations of Keynes’s moral science conception of economics and his beauty
contest analysis. First, I argue that in his characterization of economics as a moral science Keynes
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advances a reflexive, two-way circular causality conception of the economic process that contrasts
with Lionel Robbins’ one-way linear causality conception. I associate this reflexive process
conception with one meaning of complexity. Second, I argue that in his beauty contest analysis
Keynes uses reflexivity reasoning to support a second meaning of complexity associated with partwhole relationships in complex systems. The discussion in this section thus makes causal analysis
central to Keynes’s philosophical thinking – a focus which has gone relatively neglected but which
I suggest should be fundamental to philosophical analysis in economics.
Section 3 moves to how Keynes’s philosophical thinking anchors his economic thinking. First, I
show how reflexivity-complexity thinking in Keynes’s moral science conception and beauty
contest analysis provides the basis for his critique of classical Say’s Law economics and underlies
his demand-driven understanding of the economy. Second, to be more explicit about the causal
thinking involved, I lay out a formal causal model to illustrate what distinguishes a Say’s Law
economics and Keynes’s economics, and then use this difference to argue that Keynes’s economics
implies a non-ergodic understanding of the economic process. Third, to complete this discussion,
I explain how an activist economic policy based on this causal model and Keynes’s understanding
of the economy makes use of self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecy reasoning.
Section 4 turns to Keynes’s uncertainty concept and time. First I argue that Keynes’s famous
characterization of uncertain knowledge that emphasizes the absence of probability distributions
presupposes an ontological basis for why knowledge is uncertain. I then explain this ontological
basis for Keynes’s uncertainty concept in terms of what reflexive agents are and how their
behavior produces reflexive economic processes. Second, I discuss how Keynes’s thinking about
time, as recently reviewed by Anna Carabelli and Mario Cedrini (2016), rejected treating time as
if it were a spatial magnitude, and thus also reflects his reflexivity-complexity philosophical
thinking.
Section 5 comments briefly on the paper’s arguments in relation to the Keynes and philosophy
literature.

2

Keynes on economics as a moral science and the beauty contest

Keynes’s moral science conception of economics and his beauty contest account of speculative
behavior are generally discussed independently of one another. I argue, however, that his account
of speculative behavior presupposes his conception of economics as a moral science, because that
conception builds on a specific understanding of the nature of the economic process essential to
3

his beauty contest analysis. Yet Keynes’s understanding of the economic process is not generally
emphasized in discussions about his moral science conception. Rather the emphasis often lies on
how for Keynes economics is not a natural science (as it was for Robbins) because it deals with, as
he put it, “motives, expectations, psychological uncertainties” (Keynes, CW 14, 300). Yes,
certainly a key aspect of Keynes’s moral science view is that economics is unlike the natural
sciences, which do not investigate such phenomena. But what also needs to be emphasized are
what the methodological implications of this are for how economics needs to be pursued in light
of the distinctive nature of its subject matter.

a.

Keynes’s moral science conception of economics

Consider first the methodological implications of Robbins’ conception of economics as the study
of the relation between ends and scarce means with alternative uses (Robbins, 1935). Robbins
arguably employed this means-ends type of explanation because he believed markets generally
move to equilibrium. If markets generally move to equilibrium, agents can then choose means
that reliably produce their ends, thus justifying his means-ends view of economics.1 However,
what often goes overlooked about this is that this meant that the economic process could be
represented in a relatively simple causal manner as a linear, one-way movement from cause to
effect. Economics would then essentially be the study of equilibrium outcomes that these simple
causal processes produce, while the study of the processes determining those outcomes could be
largely set aside.
Suppose, however, that markets do not always move smoothly to equilibrium.2 Then the means
that agents adopt must often fail to produce their desired ends and they accordingly need to be

1

It also meant that agents could then be seen as engaging in optimizing behavior.
Keynes’s remarks in a radio talk, “Poverty in plenty: Is the economic system self-adjusting?” (The Listener,
21, November 1934) expressed essentially just this view:
2

On the one side are those who believe that the existing economic system is, in the long run, a selfadjusting system, though with creaks and groans and jerks, and interrupted by time lags, outside
interference and mistakes. […] These authorities do not, of course, believe that the system is
automatically or immediately self-adjusting. But they do believe that it has an inherent tendency
towards self-adjustment, if it is not interfered with and if the action of change is not too rapid. On
the other side of the gulf are those who reject the idea that the existing economic system is, in any
significant sense, self-adjusting. They believe that the failure of effective demand to reach the full
potentialities of supply, in spite of human psychological demand being immensely far from satisfied
for the vast majority of individuals, is due to much fundamental causes. (Keynes, CW 13, 486-487).

4

able to adjust their behavior. Such adjustments complicate Robbins’ linear, means-ends, causeto-effect logic, because they introduce feedback effects from the ends agents’ choices actually
produce but do not desire back upon their future means for the production of their intended future
ends – a two-way circular causal process generated by this reflexive feedback relationship
between means and ends. Keynes recognized, then, that when agents need to regularly adjust
their behavior we need to focus on their “motives, expectations, [and] psychological uncertainties”
rather than simply on equilibrium outcomes, because their open-ended and revisable nature is
central to explaining both how the economy operates when not in equilibrium, and also to
explaining what determines equilibrium outcomes, if and when they occur. The foundation of
Keynes’s moral science conception of economics with its emphasis on “motives, expectations,
[and] psychological uncertainties,” I thus claim, is this two-way, circular account of causality
rooted in this reflexive relationship from means to ends and ends to means. On this view, Keynes’s
moral science conception of economics could also be termed a reflexive process conception of
economics.3
This causal account consequently provides of us one of two meanings of complexity I distinguish,
namely, the idea of a process that is not simple and linear because it is causally circular. An
economy understood in this way, then, is complex not just epistemically – because the phenomena
we seek to explain are, in Keynes’s words, “in too many respects, not homogeneous through time”
(CW 14, 297) – but also complex ontologically, because the causal process that drives the economy
works through sets of interacting forward and backward linkages across time. But how is this
meaning of complexity actually derived from the idea of reflexivity? One of the main meanings of
reflexivity is the self-reference idea of something that reflects back upon and acts upon itself
(Sandri, 2009, 10). This, then, is what we see when agents’ means act on both their ends and also
on their subsequently adjusted means.

In effect, via the intermediation of more or less

successfully achieved ends, agents’ means reflexively operate on their means.

Keynes did allow after the publication of The General Theory that his theory could be represented as
assuming short-period expectations were always fulfilled and then represented as seeing the difference it
makes when we say they are disappointed (CW, 14, 181). Thus, however, one models the short-period for
reasons of method (cf. Kregel, 1976; Chick, 1983; Carabelli and Cedrini, 2014), Keynes clearly did not
assume that expectations had to be fulfilled, as essentially Robbins did. I return to this issue in section 4.
3

I do not discuss here, nor below, how, in economic terms, agents act when they know they cannot know
the effects of a decision made today on the future. The explanation lies in their recourse to the institution
of spot and forward money contracts, which facilitate their ability to adjust their behavior. Thanks to Paul
Davidson for this point (cf. Davidson, 2015, chapter 4).
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The second meaning of complexity I distinguish concerns systems rather than processes, and this
meaning relates reflexivity to complexity in a different yet related way, which we will see is
particularly important to Keynes’s aggregative economics. Thus, in Herbert Simon’s influential
part-whole understanding of systems, a complex system is one in which “a large number of parts
… interact in a non-simple way … [such that] the whole is more than the sum of the parts” (Simon,
1962, 359). In complex systems, then, the interaction of the system’s parts produces an aggregate
outcome at the level of the whole system which, because not reducible to that interaction, feeds
back on and affects the nature of that interaction. Then this changed interaction at the level of
the system’s parts produces a new aggregate outcome, which in turn feeds back on that
interaction, and so on and so on, in a continuing dynamic between action on these two levels. So
here feedback effects run from parts to whole and whole to parts, and this provides a further way
in which reflexivity underlies complexity, one moreover that complements how reflexivity works
at the level of the economic process through feedback relationships between agents’ means and
ends.4
Note that Walrasian macroeconomics ignores the feedback path from whole to parts via its
microfoundations doctrine that fully derives the economy as a whole from the activity of its parts.
Agents’ actions and equilibrium outcomes are perfectly compatible with one another, making the
relationship between parts and whole static and timeless. Thus the Walrasian approach extends
Robbins’ one-way causality account regarding the nature of the economic process to a one-way
causality account of the parts-whole relation. The parts (agent behavior) are fully responsible for
the whole (the nature of the economy), producing a simple rather than complex understanding of
the economy as a whole as a companion to the linear understanding of the economic process.
In Section 3 I will discuss how the system level understanding of complexity is central to Keynes’s
critique of classical supply-side economics and demand-driven understanding of the economy,
but to introduce this discussion I first want to discuss the connection between Keynes’s moral
science conception and his beauty contest analysis. I have argued that Keynes’s moral science
view, with its focus on agents’ “motives, expectations, psychological uncertainties,” is rooted in a
specific conception of what sort of process operates in the economy. However, his beauty contest
analysis, with its attention to a structure of expectations over and above individual expectations,
employs a systems-parts reasoning. I will try to show, then, that this latter analysis both

4 For a direct application of this part-whole relation to Keynes’s economics, see Harcourt’s two views of how

the relation can work in his ‘wolf pack’ analogy (1995).
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presupposes the feedback logic of Keynes’s process conception, and also extends it to a system
level reflexivity-complexity view that also operates in his economics.

b.

Keynes’s beauty contest analysis

How, then, does Keynes’s beauty contest treatment of speculative behavior employ reflexivity
reasoning (CW 7, 156)? On the surface, what Keynes’s analysis does is demonstrate how a world
framed in terms of agents’ “motives, expectations, psychological uncertainties” can generate
financial market phenomena that are “in too many respects, not homogeneous through time.”
Why this happens, however, is not immediately clear, since, as rational expectations thinking
shows, it is neither necessary nor obvious that ‘psychological uncertainty’ per se should produce
such a world. Note, then, that a key assumption of rational expectations thinking is that agents
form their expectations independently of one another as isolated agents. In contrast, in Keynes’s
beauty contest agents form their expectations interdependently.

Accordingly, if rational

expectations agents are thought to form their expectations in regard to ‘fundamentals’ (in effect,
the inherent beauty of the women in the newspaper pictures), then Keynes’s agents form their
expectations, not only in regard to these ‘fundamentals,’ but also by attending to what they believe
other agents believe constitute the ‘fundamentals’ of those newspaper pictures.
Thus, in the first instance a feedback relation runs for each individual agent from a belief about
other agents’ beliefs back to that individual agent’s own beliefs – a reflexive relation that operates
at the process level. Yet since agents form their expectations interdependently, and all agents’
expectations indirectly affect all other agents’ expectations, there additionally exists a feedback
relation that runs from the entire structure of interdependent agent expectations back to each
individual agent’s expectations – a reflexive relation between whole and part. Thus the beauty
contest analysis combines both the process and systems reflexivity-complexity connections, and
the complexity of the situation Keynes describes then derives from how these two reflexivitycomplexity connections interact in particular circumstances.5
The expectations of Keynes’s individual agents, then, are potentially subject to constant
adjustment since a change in any one agent’s beliefs about other agents’ expectations could set off
a chain of inter-agent adjustments that affect the structure of expectations which in turn then
feeds back on and affects these adjustments. Neoclassical economists often argue, of course, that
5

Soros (e.g., 2013) also frames the link between Keynes’s beauty contest analysis and a rejection of rational
expectations thinking in terms of reflexivity and complexity, but does not explicitly distinguish the process
and part-whole senses of reflexivity-complexity I have employed here.
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over time individual agents should improve their beliefs and expectations in a Bayesian kind of
way as they learn about an expectation adjustment process, and so that they would not constantly
keep revising their expectations.

Note, then, that this view of expectation adjustment is

formulated strictly at the process level, and ignores the systems level source of complexity. That
is, it rules out that the economy as a whole is affected by agents’ revising their expectations and
how this could feed back on and affect that adjustment process. In effect, assuming that agents
do not keep revising their expectations is tantamount to assuming that the path of the economy
is independent of the overall expectation formation process, or, as Robbins thought, that the
economy inevitably moves to equilibrium.
Keynes, however, used his beauty contest analysis to show that when agents form their
expectations interdependently, the adjustment in individual expectations that occurs at the level
of the economic process creates a structure of expectations that is also in constant adjustment
relative to this process. Thus, if his moral science conception of economics was not persuasive to
economists who accepted Robbins’ simple linear cause-effect view of economics, his beauty
contest analysis of speculative behavior offered a concrete way of making the case that economics
is a complex science by showing that it also dealt with complex part-whole relationships. The
advantage of that demonstration, moreover, was that it went beyond general claims about the
nature of causality in economics in regard to the nature of the economic process, and modeled a
specific overall structure of interaction that clearly worked through a reflexive feedback channel.
To illustrate this, I formally represent how this feedback channel works in the next section.
Perhaps less obvious in all this is that Keynes’s focus on “motives, expectations, psychological
uncertainties” suggests that we needed a new characterization of the economic agent alternative
to Robbins’ means-ends (optimizing) agents. If we characterize such agents as reflexive economic
agents, then their principle characteristic is not instrumentally rational optimizing behavior but
rather being able to constantly adjust to change in the basis on which they act. In section 4 I use
this characterization to explain how Keynes’s uncertainty concept has an ontological basis. That
is, ultimately his reflexivity reasoning underlies his uncertainty concept because ontologically
speaking economic agents’ reflexive behavior produces uncertainty. Let me turn now to how
Keynes’s economics rests on this reflexivity-complexity theory foundation.

3

Keynes’s economics and policy activism

8

Here, I first connect Keynes’s moral science and beauty contest reflexivity and complexity
thinking to his critique of Say’s Law and his demand-driven understanding of the economy.
Second, I develop a causal model to show how the presence or absence of a feedback channel
differentiates linear from a circular causal representations of the economy, and then use this to
argue that the presence of a feedback channel in circular representations implies the economic
process is non-ergodic. Third, I discuss how the circular causal model frames economic policy in
terms of ideas of self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecies.

a.

Keynes’s critique of Say’s Law and his demand-drive alternative

Say’s Law, the idea that supply creates its own demand, means an economy’s resources determine
its level of output, and demand plays only a passive role in buying back produced output. An
economy’s resources are thus its scarce means and its level of output, demanded and consumed,
is the end those resources are used to produce. For Keynes, then, this explanation involves
another expression of Robbins’ one-way, means-ends, cause-to-effect reasoning, which in this
instance ignores how demand, should it be insufficient and fail to buy back produced output, has
a feedback effect on supply through the adjustments it sets off on the part of producers. That is,
Keynes’s critique of Say’s Law relies on his two-way circular understanding of causality in which
a reflexive relationship operates both from means to ends and ends to means across aggregate
supply and demand.
Specifically, at the level of the economic process, this works through how producers’ “motives,
expectations, psychological uncertainties” factor into their constant efforts to estimate demand.
Failure to forecast demand correctly causes adjustments on their part that give demand feedback
effects on supply. Then in terms of the economy as a part-whole system, this works through how
the interaction of the components of aggregate demand (the parts of the whole) influences the
level of output (the whole of the economy) and how changes in the level of output in turn influence
the interaction between the components of demand. Should, say, consumption and investment
goods not be demanded in the proportion in which they have been produced, the total output
subsequently produced will likely change. This in turn is likely to influence the composition of
future demand for consumption and investment goods, which then likely influences total output
subsequently produced, and so on and so on.

In contrast to Robbins’ classical focus on

equilibrium outcomes, then, Keynes’s focus is on the economic process and how the economy
adjusts when not in equilibrium.
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If this explains Keynes’s critique of Say’s Law in reflexivity terms, consider now how this two-way
circular understanding of cumulative causality operates in Keynes’s demand-driven
understanding of the economy, particularly in regard to important role played by investment
spending. Recall that one of the main meanings of reflexivity is the self-reference idea of
something that reflects back on and acts upon itself. I illustrated this above in connection with
how at the level of the economic process agents’ means reflexively operate on their future means
via the intermediation of more or less successfully achieved ends. In the case of Keynes’s
aggregate demand analysis, then, we can see this two-way dynamic through the multiplieraccelerator relationship between investment and the economy’s resources used in production.
That is, in process terms just as those resources are means to investment spending, so investment
spending is a means to producing additional resources for production, so that at the process level
investment reflexively acts upon itself. This two-way dynamic also works in terms of the economy
as a whole through the multiplier. Changes in demand, whatever the source, work through the
multiplier to change the size of the economy. But change in the size of the economy then
influences the circumstances determining demand.

Thus the parts of the economy, the

components of aggregate demand, affect the economy as a whole, which in turn affects those parts
or components in a continuing dynamic centered on the role of aggregate demand.

b.

Linear and circular causal models of the economy

So the difference between the classical Say’s Law view of the economy and Keynes’s demanddriven view comes down to an ontological disagreement over the nature of the causal process
governing the economy. I have argued that this disagreement is ultimately a matter whether
reflexivity operates through a feedback channel and plays a significant role especially in regard to
the overall causal process governing the economy. To show this formally, I provide a causal model
that includes both a standard linear cause-effect relationship and also a feedback channel whereby
this relationship acts on itself. I first model the Say’s Law case where the feedback channel exists
but is benign and only confirms Say’s Law. I then model Keynes’s thinking where the feedback
channel plays an important role and refutes Say’s Law.
The Say’s Law model of the economy, then, assumes a direct cause-effect relationship between an
economy’s resources, a, and the economy’s level of output, b, or:

a -> b

[1]
10

How then does the feedback channel work in the Say’s Law case? Since the demand for output
can only play a passive role restricted to buying back that output, economic agents must believe
that [1] is the case, must form expectations appropriate to this belief, and must act consistently
with [1]. Thus the resources-output cause-effect relationship [1] acts reflexively on itself but only
so as to confirm itself:

a -> b -> (a -> b)

[2]

That is, [2] asserts that not only does supply create its own demand as in [1], the first part the
expression, but [1] produces itself, as shown in the second part of the expression as (a -> b).
Note that [1] and [2] represent two different causal relationships, where [1] is a direct causal
relation between a and b, and [2] is the feedback channel showing how that direct causal relation
acts on itself. Putting these together for their combined overall effects (=>) thus tells us that the
economy’s resources alone determine the level of output, b, and the Say’s Law relation, (a -> b),
holds:

a and a -> b and a -> b -> (a -> b) => b and (a -> b)

[3]

Thus, since the feedback channel fully validates the direct causal relation in the sense of showing
it to be a complete and sufficient representation of the economy, the causal model is effectively
linear.
Contrast this with Keynes’s case. The economy’s resources, a, still affect level of output, b, so [1]
as a direct causal relation still holds. But agents’ beliefs, expectations, and actions influence how
the economy’s resources determine that level of output, so the feedback channel – how the direct
causal relation acts on itself – changes the nature of the relation between a and b, so that [2] is
then replaced as follows:

11

a -> b -> (a -> b)’

[4]

That is, the (a -> b)’ relation represents how the economy’s resources determine the level of output
according to the influence demand has on that relation, and Say’s Law no longer holds.
Finally, replacing the a -> b relation by the (a -> b)’ relation, [3] is then replaced for overall effects
as follows:

a and a -> b and a -> b -> (a -> b)’ => b and (a -> b)’

[5]

In this case, the Say’s Law linear causal analysis with its benign feedback channel is replaced by
Keynes’s circular causal analysis with a feedback channel that modifies the direct effects of
resources on output. Resources still affect output as in [1], but how they affect output depends on
how that relation affects itself through agents’ expectations, beliefs, and actions regarding the
relation between resources and output.
The model, then, makes explicit the role reflexivity plays in Keynes’s thinking via the difference it
makes in causal analysis. Expression [1] involves a standard form of causal reasoning in showing
how one factor (or set of factors) operates on another factor. But expressions [2] and [4] go
beyond this ‘between factors’ type of causal analysis to show how an entire causal relationship can
act on itself (in two different ways). Robbins’ and Say’s Law causal thinking is restricted to the
more traditional ‘between factors’ type of causal analysis, and for that reason involves a linear
kind of explanation that lends itself to an equilibrium view of the economy. Keynes’s causal
thinking was richer in recognizing that causal relationships can also act upon themselves. This
meant that economies followed complex causal paths, and do not necessarily move to equilibrium.
His aggregative economics, accordingly, involved not just a new method of analysis, but also a
methodological departure from neoclassical economics in explaining the economy not only at the
level of causal relations between factors operating within the economy, but also at the level of
change in the causal relationships governing whole of the economy.
This thinking has one very important implication for how we understand the dynamics of
economies. On a Say’s Law neoclassical view of the world, the benign feedback channel makes
12

Say’s Law a law in the strong sense in natural science of a relationship that holds independently
of human behavior. Alternatively, the economy is thought to work as a dependable mechanism
whose performance is never changing in the manner of a law of nature. It also means that a Say’s
Law world is a world that is closed, deterministic, and ergodic.6
Contrast this with Keynes’s view of the world. The way the economy works is not independent of
human behavior. Though we can identify ‘law-like’ relationships such as [1], they do not work in
an unchanging, natural science way, and thus the economic world should be seen as open, nondeterministic, and non-ergodic.

As Paul Davidson (1996) puts it, the economic world is

‘transmutable’ because human behavior modifies and changes those relationships. I turn now to
what this implies about the nature of economic policy.

c.

Economic policy in terms of self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecies

Of course also distinctive of Keynes economics is his rejection of classical economics’ laissez faire
stance toward the economy in favor of an activist view of economic policy. Understandably, if one
operates with a classical, linear causal view of an economy that always moves to equilibrium, there
is little basis for policy activism, and so many of Keynes’s critics who operate with this causal
thinking have likely thought his activist stance incomprehensible. Yet if the economy is open and
changed by human behavior, then economic policy can be instrumental in determining the
economy’s pathway.
It seems that there are two senses, then, in which an activist economic policy can influence the
economy depending on one view of the causal nature of the economy. One could still employ a
‘between factors’ linear causal thinking, and argue that policy acts like pulling a mechanical lever
to speed convergence to an equilibrium determined by the relationships between the main factors
governing the economy, perhaps as understood in an ISLM type of Keynesianism. Alternatively,
one could recognize that how policy is constructed influences the way in which the main factors
governing the economy operate, and thus see policy as not only acting like a lever, but as also
affecting how economic agents act in regard to the relations believed to govern the economy. That
is, policy can operate not only on the direct causal relationships operating in the economy, but

6 There is a recent extended debate regarding ergodicity versus non-ergodicity in Keynes’s thinking between

Paul Davidson and Rod O’Donnell (see Rosser, 2015). I do not address this debate for reasons discussed at
the beginning of section 4.
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also on the feedback channel through which agents judge and act on those relationships.
Keynes emphasized this latter role in his attention to how the state of long-term expectations in
the economy depends on the state of confidence. First he asserted that, “The state of long-term
expectation, upon which our decisions are based, does not solely depend … on the most probable
forecast we can make” (Keynes, 1973, 148). Any “probable forecast” that agents make, then, would
concern the main factors governing the economy – the ‘between factors’ linear causal thinking and thus the direct causal relations believed to hold between those factors. But, Keynes then goes
on to say: “It [the state of long-term expectations] also depends on the confidence with which we
make this forecast or how highly we rate the likelihood of our best forecast turning out quite
wrong” (Ibid.; his emphasis). Here by confidence he refers to how confident agents are that those
causal relations about which they make probable forecasts are as they have been in the past or
whether they have changed. Thus here Keynes effectively asks how those direct causal relations
reflexively act upon themselves, that is, through the feedback channel.7
Consequently, Keynes saw economic policy as operating in an environment of judgments and
expectations about the stability and determinacy of causal relationships governing the economy.
In general, he believed that environment tended to be relatively settled and most causal
relationships were typically taken to hold most of the time. “In practice we have tacitly agreed, as
a rule, to fall back on what is a convention. The essence of this convention … lies in assuming that
the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely, except in so far as we have specific reasons
to expect a change” (Ibid., 152). It follows from this, however, that matters are not expected to
“continue indefinitely” when agents “have specific reasons to expect a change,” one instance of
which is when economic policies are put in place that are explicitly designed to give agents
“specific reasons to expect a change” in “the existing state of affairs.”
Broadly speaking, then, what Keynes is referring to is the possibility that policies can change
expectations and attitudes in such a way as to realize policy goals through the effects they can have
on agents’ views of how economic relationships are likely to operate. Such policies act, I suggest,
like self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecies. Robert K. Merton explained a self-fulfilling
prophecy as a prediction that changes behavior in such a way as to cause itself to become true
7

The same distinction between direct causal relations and the feedback channel is immediately taken up
again on the following page in regard to the marginal efficiency of capital and the state of confidence. The
marginal efficiency of capital concerns a direct causal relation between additional capital and additional
output. Keynes says, however, that, “The state of confidence is relevant because it is one of the major factors
determining the former” (Keynes, 1973, 149). That is, the feedback channel determines how the direct
causal relation the marginal efficiency of capital schedule involves operates.
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(Merton, 1968). In contrast, a self-defeating prophecy is a prediction that changes behavior so as
to falsify itself.8 What the two sorts of prophecies share, then, is the idea that agents can be
influenced through the feedback channel to change their views about how causal relationships
operate in an economy, such that when they act on those views they may actually change how
those causal relationships operate.
Suppose, for example, that an economy has protracted high unemployment. A fiscal expansion
could both influence income and employment, through the direct relation between income and
spending, and also influence the state of confidence, through the feedback channel, and thereby
function as a self-fulling prophecy. Or suppose an economy faces an inflationary spiral. A fiscal
contraction could both work on inflation, through the direct relation between spending and prices,
and also work on inflationary psychology, through the feedback channel, and act as a selfdefeating prophecy.
From this perspective, Keynes’s reflexivity thinking can be interpreted as providing foundations
for a complexity understanding of economic policy. David Colander and Roland Kuper (2016)
argue that central to a complexity understanding of economic policy is the recognition that policy
instruments, thought to work dependably in controlled circumstances, often have counterintuitive and unexpected effects in complex environments. Self-fulfilling and self-defeating
prophecies, then, are counter-intuitive phenomena in that they reverse status quo states of affairs.
They do so, moreover, through how the prophecy or prediction changes behavior, which then
feeds back on and changes the basis on which the prophecy or prediction was made. A complexity
understanding of economic policy, then, relies on the feedback channel that Keynes saw operating
on the state of confidence. Essentially, what an activist economic policy therefore does is
manipulate reigning conventions in such a way as to encourage economic agents to “have specific
reasons to expect a change” where previously they did not.

4

Uncertainty and time in Keynes’s philosophical thinking

The goal of this section is to show that a reflexivity-complexity philosophical thinking in Keynes

8

Merton’s self-fulfilling prophecy example was how a false evaluation of a bank’s solvency can precipitate
a bank run and cause the bank to become truly insolvent. A famous self-defeating prophecy is the prediction
that all computers would crash at the beginning of the year 2000. That prediction changed computer
programmers’ behavior, so that computers did not crash as predicted. Soros (2013) explains self-fulfilling
prophecies in terms of Popper’s thinking in The Poverty of Historicism (1957).
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underlies his uncertainty concept giving it a primarily ontological basis. One consequence of the
argument here is that non-ergodicity has a somewhat different basis in Keynes’s thought than has
recently been debated. A second consequence is that it allows us to attribute a philosophy of time
to Keynes that goes beyond the view that the future is simply unknown.

a.

Keynes’s uncertainty concept

I claimed at the outset that I would interpret Keynes’s concept of uncertainty in terms of
reflexivity-complexity theory, emphasizing the concept’s ontological basis in contrast to the
epistemic basis that is often emphasized. To be sure, Keynes clearly gives his uncertainty concept
an epistemic interpretation in his oft-cited characterization of uncertain knowledge:
By ‘uncertain’ knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean merely to distinguish what is
known for certain from what is only probable …. The sense in which I am using the term
is that in which the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the
rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention, or the position
of private wealth-owners in the social system in 1970. About these matters there is no
scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not
know (Keynes, CW 14, 213).
What he emphasizes here is the lack of probability distributions for such phenomena. But why
probability distributions are unavailable for certain phenomena is an ontological issue regarding
the nature of the world that must accordingly be prior to the epistemic one in determining the
meaning of Keynes’s uncertainty concept. Indeed, it seems fair to say this is the way Keynes saw
the matter. Consider the recent debate, then, over Keynes and ergodicity versus non-ergodicity.
That debate has focused on whether probability distributions for economic phenomena are
knowable.9 But of course if probability distributions do not exist for certain phenomena, those
distributions are not only not knowable, but the whole question regarding whether they can or
cannot be known is beside the point. Keynes essentially says this when he asserts that sometimes
they are simply unknowable. Indeed, since the lack of probability distributions for phenomena
means those phenomena cannot be homogeneous, stationary, or ergodic (Rosser, 2015), Keynes’s
9

See footnote 4. This is O’Donnell’s focus in rejecting non-ergodicity as a basis for Keynes’s uncertainty
concept. However, Davidson’s argument in favor of non-ergodicity is based on an ontological
understanding of Keynes’s uncertainty concept.
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view that the phenomena are not homogeneous or stationary means they are also non-ergodic
(even though he did not use this concept). So Keynes’s comment that uncertain knowledge is that
about which “We simply do not know” short-circuits the ergodicity versus non-ergodicity debate
since he presupposes that the economic world is non-ergodic, because he presupposes that
uncertainty is ultimately an ontological matter.
Thus, since my argument in this paper has been that Keynes’s reasoned ontologically in reflexivity
terms, we should be able to explain his concept of uncertainty in reflexivity terms. Above I
explained a reflexive economics process in terms of the behavior of what I called reflexive
economic agents. Let me first be more explicit about what a reflexive agent is by comparing that
conception with the traditional utility maximizing agent (cf. Davis, 2016, 2017). For the latter,
the basis on which action occurs is unchanging, as in Robbins’s means-ends type of explanation.
Indeed, traditional instrumental rationality analysis requires that the basis on which choices are
made be taken as given (as in exogenous preferences) in order to function as determinate means
to agents’ utility maximum ends. In contrast, for reflexive agents, a conception I have attributed
to Keynes with his emphasis on “motives, expectations, [and] psychological uncertainties,” the
basis on which action occurs is always changing as they constantly re-appraise the relation
between ends and means, adjusting their behavior in such a manner as to create a reflexive
relationship from means to ends and ends to means.
This reflexive agent conception, and the reflexive process conception it produces, is thus what
ultimately makes the world uncertain for Keynes, since, as well demonstrated in his beauty contest
analysis, the world evolves according to how agents’ “motives, expectations, [and] psychological
uncertainties” interact and change – a matter Keynes clearly believed to be inherently uncertain.
A consequence of this, then, is that the world is indeed non-ergodic, but the basis for nonergodicity in Keynes’s thinking is not epistemic but rather ontological. In effect, we need not even
ask whether the phenomena empirically are homogeneous and stationary because we know that
economic relationships are constantly subject to change.

Borrowing an expression and

explanation from Sheila Dow, “fundamental uncertainty is endogenous to behaviour and to [the
economy’s] structure,” both of which are constantly subject to change due to the “openness of the
economic system” (Dow, 2015, 36).

b.

Keynes philosophical thinking about time
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Finally, I comment on what reflexivity implies about Keynes’s thinking about time. Carabelli and
Cedrini (2016) argue that Keynes never opted for a ‘mechanistic approach’ to time because from
early in his time at Cambridge, when he first considered the difficult issue of how time might be
measured, he believed it was impossible to produce a determinate unit of time. A mechanistic
approach represents time as if it were a spatial magnitude with determinate relations governing
the measurement of its extent. But Keynes believed change is essential to time, whereas a spatial
magnitude is given and static. This meant for Keynes that time could not be laid out as a
succession of equal time intervals ranging across past, present, and future, because there was no
way to treat those intervals as comparable to one another when the passage of time involved
change. Nonetheless, even if its unit of measurement could not be determined, time understood
in terms of change was still susceptible of representation in terms of the fundamental temporal
logic of before and after, where the latter involves change from the former.
My argument, then, is that Keynes’s thinking about time is closely linked to his thinking about
causality as a two-way relationship between cause and effect dependent upon reflexive feedback.
What Keynes’s moral science thinking shows when we focus on the behavior of reflexive agents is
that since the basis on which they act is constantly transformed by how their actions produce
outcomes and ends that were not fully intended, the past – the basis on which they previously
acted – is always discontinuous with the present basis on which they must immediately act. Thus
time cannot be represented as a succession of equal time intervals. In effect, the passage of time
constantly changes how the past and the present relate to one another. Yet at the same time, the
past and the present are still connected in time because agents’ actions in the past provide the
grounds from which they adjust their subsequent behavior. A reflexive process conception of the
economy, then, derived from the constantly adjusted behavior of reflexive agents, involves a
conception of time that cannot be represented in the manner of a spatial magnitude, but which
still involves a connected process of change that temporally distinguishes and links before and
after.
To be sure, this analysis is complicated by Keynes’s post-General Theory ambivalence regarding
whether short-period expectations should be thought to be fulfilled or not,10 since if they are, then
agents do not constantly adjust their behavior, and it might be argued that a succession of time
periods would then be susceptible to some common unit of measure. A case can be made,
however, that in light of his Marshallian heritage Keynes was willing to consider short-period

10

See footnote 2. Also see Harcourt (1981).
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expectations as fulfilled as a practical expedient he regarded as part of a method of analysis – a
“two-stages methodology” (Carabelli and Cedrini, 2014). This of course puts the matter on an
epistemological level, whereas the argument generally developed in this paper and also with
respect to Keynes’s thinking about time puts the things on an ontological level. Thus, if Keynes
regarded it as a desirable expedient methodologically speaking to treat short-period expectations
as fulfilled, this says nothing about whether he believed that ontologically speaking economies
move to equilibria and whether agents do or do not constantly need to adjust their plans. Indeed,
Keynes’s thinking about uncertainty clearly tells us that the possibility that agents might need to
adjust their plans is always a reality.

Thus it seems clear that Keynes never opted for a

‘mechanistic approach’ to time conceived on the order of a spatial magnitude, and that his
economics ultimately depends on the idea that time is inseparable from change.
How, then, does Keynes’s thinking about time reflect the idea that the economy complex? The
two ways I argued his moral science conception and beauty contest analysis explain complexity
are respectively at the level of reflexive processes and in terms of reflexive part-whole
relationships. Both operate and interact with one another, I then argued, in how the economy is
complex for Keynes. So we might also ask, what conception of time is appropriate to an economy
understood to be complex? Quite simply, just as a non-complex, linear causal view of an economy
encourages us to represent time as if it were like a spatial magnitude, rolling out into the future
in a succession of intervals no different than those that occurred in the past, so a complexity view
of an economy rejects this conception for a view of time in before and after terms, where the latter
is discontinuous with but connected to the former. This conception, it should also be emphasized,
is not only one that presupposes the economic world is non-ergodic, but also one that justifies an
activist view of economic policy as capable of genuinely changing the future.

5

Concluding comments on the Keynes and philosophy literature

I suggested at the outset that making causal analysis central to Keynes’s philosophical thinking
produces a focus that has gone relatively neglected in Keynes scholarship. My view is that the
reason for this neglect is that many commentators implicitly think in terms of a linear, ‘between
factors’ type of causal analysis, and so fail to systematically examine the reverse causal pathway
that feedback effects involve, despite evidence that Keynes recognized the existence of feedback
effects. Thus they fail to appreciate the distinction between a direct, ‘between factors’ type of
causal relation and a feedback channel operating on that direct relation, and consequently lack
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grounds for understanding how the economy can be regarded as complex. Partly, it seems, the
reason for this is that the philosophy of Keynes has long been associated with the epistemology of
Keynes, so that the issue of what Keynes’s ontological thinking has been little investigated, if even
recognized. So in my view many of the disputes about Keynes’s philosophical thinking – for
example, the non-ergodicity dispute – have failed to come to ground, because they have not
addressed what these issues ultimately concern. That concern is how the world works, a matter
that is prior to how we think about how agents think it works, and thus prior to how we think
about the role knowledge plays in the world.
Beyond the causal model presented here, with its distinction between a direct, ‘between factors’
relation and a feedback channel operating on that direct relation, what else is central to the
argument of this paper is its characterization of economic agents, which I have argued Keynes at
least implicitly held given his beauty contest analysis. In contrast to the standard, means-end
agent conception with its fixed basis for action, the basis for action in the case of reflexive agents
is always changing as a result of how they see the way in which the effects of their actions feed
back on their subsequent means and ends. Needless to say, the idea of a reflexive agent conception
has little following in contemporary economics, whereas the standard linear utility conception is
widely held. I suggest, then, that in part a further reason scholarship on Keynes’s philosophy has
been relatively restricted in the issues it addresses is that many commentators also implicitly hold
the standard conception of an agent – and perhaps do not even consider that an alternative
conception is needed – and thus also assume Keynes must have had such a conception as well,
despite the evidence of his beauty contest.
In this light, it seems fair to say that if the twin, mutually stabilizing pillars of (neo-) classical
philosophical thinking are equilibrium theory and utility maximizing agents, then those who
implicitly hold to these pillars are likely to see Keynes philosophically as not much different. In
all fairness, many Keynes scholars and Keynesians are quite critical of equilibrium theory (even
when they still tend to think in linear causal terms). But if they ultimately retain at least implicitly
the utility maximizing agent conception, then it seems unlikely that they will see the economy as
complex. The economy could still be seen as ‘open’ and non-ergodic because of uncertainty, but
then agents’ behavior could also be seen as a ‘rational’ response to an uncertain world, not the
behavior agents would exhibit in a complex world. Thus, as argued above, I believe uncertainty
in Keynes’s thinking needs to be seen as having deeper foundations than often thought.
Uncertainty is not only a matter of the fact, as Keynes observed, that we are simply cannot know
the future. It is also a matter of how agents actively produce an uncertain world as a result of their
20

constantly adjusting their behavior in response to more or less unmet ends.
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